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  Abstract
Population aging creates both a problem (higher taxes on a small group of workers to
finance higher public pension and health care costs) and automatic adjustments that
help to address that problem. The prospect of longer retirement involves an increased
incentive to invest in physical capital, and labour scarcity leads to higher pre-tax
wages and an increased incentive to invest in human capital. Thus, productivity
growth can be favourably affected by aging. The likely empirical magnitude of this
beneficial effect is assessed in this paper. 





The productivity challenge is gaining attention among policy makers. One reason for this 
is that the Finance Minister has “defeated” the deficit and he can now afford to shift his 
focus to other initiatives that address the same long-run objective – to increase the living 
standards of Canadians over time. A second reason for this is the warning that has been 
issued by demographers. For example, Denton and Spencer (1998) note that the rate of 
growth of per capita GDP is certain to fall significantly over coming decades unless 
either the immigration rate or the productivity growth rate increases rather dramatically. 
It is the aging of Canada's population that lies behind this concern. The purpose of this 
paper is to evaluate some of the economic analyses that have attempted to put this 
concern about aging into perspective. As we shall see, it is possible that aging can lead to 
increases in productivity growth – even if no policy initiative is taken. In other words, 
population aging may create both a problem and the solution to that problem. 
 
For the remainder of this introductory section, I explain more fully the basis for the 
concern about aging. Then, in three separate sections, I summarize research that focuses 
on reasons why it is reasonable to argue that our economy possesses built-in mechanisms 
that serve to insulate living standards (at least to some extent) from the adverse effects of 
an aging population. In section 2 of the paper, I consider how an aging population affects 
society's incentive to invest in physical capital accumulation. In section 3, the focus shifts 
to an open economy setting, where variations in the level of foreign indebtedness play a 
role that is just as important as changes in the capital stock. Finally, in section 4, I 
consider how aging affects investment in human capital. Concluding remarks are offered 
in section 5, and a brief appendix provides a fuller explanation of some of the material in 
section 4.  
 
Demographers certainly do predict that there will be dramatic growth in Canada's elderly 
dependency ratio – the number of individuals over 65 years of age divided by the number 
of individuals aged between 15-64 years. This ratio will essentially double – from 19.2% 
in 1996 to 38.5% in 2040. The most common reaction to this development is that – with 
so few workers trying to support so many dependents – it seems obvious that our living 
standards will have to fall. Indeed, many studies (such as a World Bank Report in 1994) 
have referred to this development as a "crisis". Other studies (see, for example, Emery 
and Rongve (1999) and Merette (2002)) reach much more optimistic conclusions, 
sometimes referring to the aging population phenomenon as "much ado about nothing". 
How are non-specialists to react when there is such a dispersion of views in the field?  
 
First, it should be noted that Canadians have already experienced an overall dependency 
ratio that was just as high as the level to which the overall dependency will rise in coming 
decades. In the 1950s, the youth dependency ratio was extremely high – when the baby 
boom generation was too young to work. But the overall dependency ratio was pulled 
down by the fact that there were relatively few older Canadians in those years. As time 
has passed since then – especially given the dramatic drop in birth rates (the so-called 
baby bust) – things have been in the process of switching. The youth dependency ratio 
has been falling while the old-age dependency ratio has been rising. The overall  
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dependency ratio fell as baby boomers entered the working years, and now it is rising 
again as boomers begin to retire. We managed to cope quite well with the high overall 
dependency ratio before. Optimists presume that we can do so again. 
 
Less optimistic individuals stress the fact that it costs a lot more to provide health care to 
the elderly than it does to provide education for the young. Numerous studies (such as the 
Auditor-General (1998) and Robson (2001)) have estimated that Canadian governments 
may need another 3 percentage points of GDP in revenue to finance existing programs 
for the elderly – despite some savings on other programs – when baby boomers have 
retired. Since adequate health is needed for individuals to enjoy consumption goods, and 
since an aging population involves shifting resources away from the production of 
consumption goods into the health sector, it seems that there may well be grounds for 
concern about average living standards. 
 
Despite these estimates, optimists draw attention to several factors. First, with increased 
life expectancy, and growing acceptance of flexible working arrangements (such as job 
sharing) baby boomers may choose to participate in the work force until a later age than 
have their predecessors. In addition, Canadian immigration rates may rise. Both these 
developments may limit the predicted labour shortage. Second, even if these 
developments do not occur, and labour does become scarce, that scarcity of labour should 
cause its price to rise. After all, with each scarce worker having more capital to work 
with, her productivity will be higher. The resulting increase in pre-tax wages may make it 
possible for governments to tax the generation that follows the baby boomers more (to 
afford the extra health and pension costs for the boomers) and still leave the young better 
off. The next section of the paper explains how economists evaluate this possibility. 
 
2. Aging, Relative Factor Prices, and Investment in Capital 
 
Economists use models of overlapping generations to estimate the effects of demographic 
changes on living standards. The simplest framework (Diamond (1965)) involves just two 
generations living at any point in time – the "young" and the "old". The young work with 
the existing stock of capital to produce output, and they decide how much of their income 
to consume that period (and how much to save so that they can supplement the public 
pension benefits they will receive during their old age). Saving takes the form of capital 
accumulation, and the decision to save is affected by the after-tax return that can be 
expected when the capital is employed during the individual's retirement period.  
 
To derive numerical predictions from a model of this sort, economists need to specify 
how individuals make their consumption-savings choice, and how firms make their 
labour-capital choice when producing goods. The household decision depend on how 
impatient people are, how constrained they are in their attempts to borrow, how 
accurately they can predict future wages and interest rates (the yield on capital). The 
decisions made by firms depend on how easily labour can be substituted for capital in 
production processes, how rapidly capital depreciates, and the degree of competition 
among firms. Standard practice involves consulting the empirical studies concerning all 
these issues, and with those results as a guide, selecting representative parameter values  
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for the model economy. The model economy is then used to simulate various 
developments, and numerical estimates of what can be expected to occur are calculated. 
 
Many economists have constructed model economies of this sort and reported simulation 
results. I summarize the results of one such study here – that by Scarth and Souare 
(2002). Their study is the easiest to understand since it involves the simplest, baseline 
version of the overlapping model to study the aging phenomenon. Fortunately, their 
results are representative of many of the more involved studies. To simulate the aging 
population, we need a base for comparison. Initially, therefore, the model economy is in 
equilibrium with each generation the same size as all the others. Then, a bigger baby-
boom cohort arrives, so that the economy involves more young than old for an entire 
generation. The post-baby-boom cohort is the same size as the pre-baby-boom cohorts, so 
when the baby boomers become the old generation, the model economy goes through 
conditions that are designed to be representative of what Canadians will confront in the 
next few decades. What are the results?  
 
When the baby boomers are young, their large numbers push both pre-tax wages and the 
tax rates faced by each individual down. In most simulations, the former effect dominates 
the latter, so living standards for this cohort fall somewhat. The pre-baby-boom 
generation is better off, however. Since they own the capital that has become relatively 
scarce when they are old, and since they also benefit from lower tax rates, their incomes 
and living standards rise. Overall, consumption of the average individual rises by close to 
2 percent. This analysis is consistent with what we have observed in Canada during the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1990s period, when baby-boomers flooded the labour market and 
contributed to very slow growth in wages, and older Canadians enjoyed very high interest 
income. 
 
When the baby boomers constitute the old generation in the model economy, capital is 
the relatively abundant factor of production, so interest rates fall and wage rates rise. As a 
result, the old suffer a drop in their living standards, while the young – the post baby 
boomers – enjoy an increase in consumption. The model confirms the proposition that the 
wages of the young rise more than do their taxes, so they should welcome the aging of 
the generation that has preceded them. Nevertheless, we should not make too much of 
this result, since – considering both young and old as a group – it turns out that average 
living standards fall by about 2 percent. Furthermore, when the baby boomers are retired, 
they constitute the majority of the population. Thus, they have the political power to 
increase the benefits paid to the old. In this way, part of the drop in their living standards 
can be passed on to the post baby boom generation. Overall, then, the most important 
outcome is that average living standards fall by about 2 percent. 
 
This set of results is surprisingly unaffected when major changes in the model economy 
are considered: whether households are liquidity constrained, whether individuals within 
the model accurately anticipate demographic changes and their effects, and whether 
governments offer favourable tax treatment for household saving. This latter issue has 
been stressed in the literature (especially by Merette (2002)). As the baby boom 
generation ages, the RRSP system shifts from being an arrangement that can limit  
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government revenue (when the majority of the population is working and getting tax 
breaks by contributing to their retirement savings plans) to one that can increase 
government revenue (when the majority of the population is retired and having to pay tax 
on the income generated by that savings). But the model economy involves two important 
features – that both government debt and per-capita government spending are fixed. 
Thus, when government revenue would otherwise be affected by variations in the 
proportions of the population that are paying into and receiving payments from their 
RRSPs, tax rates are adjusted. This is one of the reasons that the model economy's 
predictions are so unaffected by a major specification change such as the existence (or 
not) of tax-sheltered savings plans. 
 
3. Aging and Foreign Indebtedness 
 
Other, rather different, versions of overlapping generations models support the general 
conclusion that has just been reported. In some specifications, there are many generations 
alive at the same time. Instead of there being just two cohorts, the young and the old, with 
the period of analysis being an entire generation (roughly 30 years), there are dozens of 
cohorts coexisting at each point in time (with a new one born every year). Scarth and 
Jackson (2000) have used this version of model economy to investigate an alternative 
way for the old-age dependency ratio to increase. Instead of a temporary, but long-
lasting, period involving an older population (as discussed above), they consider a 
permanent reduction in the average retirement age. In this scenario, the aging population 
occurs because the average person spends a longer portion of her life in retirement. 
Another important difference in this analysis is that it is designed to represent a small 
open economy. 
 
The model economy discussed in the previous section involves the assumption that the 
ratio of the wage rate to the interest rate is determined by the relative scarcity of labour 
and physical capital. There is no constraint that factor prices bear any relationship to what 
labour and capital earn elsewhere in the world. For that reason, it is best to apply that 
model to the entire North American economy. Since the Canadian and American 
populations are aging at roughly the same rates, this is a natural application of the model.  
 
However, if we want to consider an analysis that is to be applied exclusively to Canada, 
we must recognize that there are serious limits on how much any one small country's 
factor prices can depart from what is observed elsewhere. In the modern "globalized" 
world, capital is very mobile internationally. Indeed, many studies assume that the option 
of moving capital elsewhere makes it impossible for domestic interest rates to depart, in 
any lasting way, from the yield available in the rest of the world. With the most common 
specification for the input-output process, the fact that the interest rate is determined in 
the rest of the world is sufficient to make the level of the domestic economy's wages 
determined in the rest of the world as well. Within this framework, then, it is possible to 
decompose the effect of a rising old-age dependency ratio on average living standards 
into two components – one that occurs because the domestic population is aging, and the 
other that occurs because the population in the rest of the world is aging. Only the second 
of these developments changes relative factor prices in the domestic economy.   




An older population continues to bring lower living standards, but – as with the simpler 
closed-economy overlapping generations specification discussed in the previous section 
of the paper – living standards fall by a smaller percentage than does the labour force. In 
this setting, the cushion is provided partly by changing factor prices and partly by a 
change in the economy's foreign indebtedness. In simulations involving Scarth and 
Jackson's specification, living standards are reduced by a little over 4 percent if the 
retirement age falls by an amount that increases the dependency ratio by what we expect 
to observe for several decades following 2030. Faced with a longer expected retirement, 
individuals save more. As a result, the country pays off some of its pre-existing foreign 
debt. Since higher saving means less consumption for a while, there is "short-term pain". 
But, eventually, with smaller interest payment obligations to foreigners, domestic 
individuals can consume more, and there is "long-term gain". This gain counteracts – at 
least partially – the drop in living standards that occurs when there is less labour available 
to produce consumption goods. Living standards fall by 3 percent if only the domestic 
economy involves an aging population. The additional 1 percentage point drop in living 
standards occurs if there is an equivalent increase in the dependency ratio in the rest of 
the world (an event that causes the domestic interest rate to fall). Some readers may find 
this last outcome surprising, since it usually assumed that lower interest rates are "good" 
for the economy.  
 
It is true that lower borrowing costs make it profitable for firms to hire more capital, and 
more capital to work with makes labour more productive. But this favourable effect on 
domestic incomes competes with an unfavourable effect. With lower interest rates, 
individuals choose to save less. As a result, foreign debt (and the associated level of 
interest payment obligations) is higher. In short, GDP is larger, but the ratio of GNP to 
GDP is lower. Since domestic income is GNP, not GDP, this unfavourable effect cannot 
be ignored. As just noted, it turns out that the unfavourable effect dominates.  
 
Before ending this section of the paper, we touch on two issues: first, that aging will 
affect the economy in ways other than by raising the dependency ratio, and second, that 
other important developments – such as government debt reduction - will likely continue 
as aging proceeds. Also, we indicate how estimates of one-time effects on the level of 
living standards can be converted to equivalent changes in the productivity growth rate.  
 
One of the reasons for the aging population is rising life expectancy. The models that we 
have discussed have been used to examine this aspect of aging, and have found that 
favourable effects emerge. People who live longer have an increased incentive to save. 
Individuals acquire more capital and they achieve lower foreign indebtedness as a result, 
and (other things equal) these developments raise living standards.  
 
A second aspect of an aging population is a falling birth rate, since a population with 
many old people has a smaller proportion of individuals in the child-bearing phase of life. 
As a result, Canada's population growth rate is expected to fall. 
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According to standard growth theory, low population growth is associated with higher 
living standards – since less of each year’s output must be withheld from consumption 
and used to provide each worker with an adequate supply of capital. There is tension 
between this proposition and recent discussions of our aging population. For example, the 
Auditor General (1998) predicts a large drop in government revenue (and therefore in 
living standards for those dependent on government transfers) when lower population 
growth makes GDP growth fall. Scarth (2001) uses a small open-economy version of a 
standard growth model – with overlapping generations, life-cycle features, and both 
forward-looking and liquidity-constrained consumers – to examine these competing 
effects. It is found that the “rich” are better off with lower population growth (just as 
standard theory predicts), while the “poor” are worse off (as predicted by analysts such as 
the Auditor General). The model permits us calculate the present value of all gains and 
losses. The conclusion is that the rich gain by much more than the poor lose, so – as long 
as the rich and poor are given equal weight, and the economist’s standard rule for 
evaluating alternatives, the hypothetical compensation criterion is applied – the analysis 
supports the proposition that lower population growth is “good”.   
 
So the lower population growth dimension of the aging population is cause for more 
optimism regarding how average living standards will fare as the population ages. 
Nevertheless, the incomes of individuals who are dependent on government transfers will 
be squeezed slightly, and income redistribution may become increasingly difficult in a 
global economy where mobile "rich" individuals can escape taxes that exceed 
international norms. Furthermore, since skilled biased technical change will likely 
continue to increase the inequality of pre-tax-and-transfer incomes, it would be imprudent 
to put too much weight on this consideration. In short, in the face of rising demands for 
governments to address growing inequality, both within Canada and throughout the 
world, policy makers may feel constrained to increase immigration rates by enough to 
avoid a significant drop in overall population growth.  
 
One important difference between the model-economy simulations that have been 
discussed and Canada's future is that the simulations have assumed that the aging 
population is the only shock to hit the economy, while other important developments will 
very likely be occurring simultaneously as Canada's population ages. One such 
development is government debt reduction. Many studies (such as Scarth and Jackson) 
have indicated that if the federal debt-to-GDP ratio continues its downward trend and 
reaches its previous post-war low of about 20 percent, we can expect average living 
standards to increase by about 3 percent. This is roughly just what is needed to allow 
Canadians to shift resources from the production of consumer goods to the provision of 
health care for the elderly – a requirement that was excluded in the simulations that were 
reported above.  Thus, the two excluded considerations essentially "cancel off" one 
another. Debt reduction can give governments just the new room needed in their budgets 
to cope with the rising health care cost problem.  
 
Nevertheless, it is still the case that the built-in mechanisms that insulate living standards 
from the aging phenomenon are incomplete. We are left with something like a 3 
percentage point reduction in average living standards (since this is the average of the 2%  
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estimate discussed in section 2 of the paper and the 4% estimate discussed in this section 
of the paper, and since all these simulations exclude the two effects which cancel off).  
 
We close this section of the paper by indicating how one-time level effects on the 
standard of living can be converted to equivalent rate of growth effects. The following 
illustrative calculation can put the 3 percent one-time reduction finding into a 
productivity-growth-rate perspective. Growth in real per-capita income of 2.1 percent per 
year for 30 years results in living standards rising by a factor of 1.865. Growth at one 
tenth of one percentage point less (that is by 2 percent per year) for the same period 
results in living standards that are higher by a factor of 1.811 – an outcome that is 3 
percent lower than what is achieved with the higher growth rate. Thus, one way of 
summarizing the simulation results is by saying that the aging population can be expected 
to reduce the annual growth rate in Canadian living standards by about one tenth of one 
percentage point. Many Canadians may regard this loss as fairly modest, especially when 
it is realized that an even smaller estimated loss is warranted if it is not assumed that 
immigration rates will be increased. 
 
4. Aging and Investment in Human Capital 
 
The economic analyses that have been reported in earlier sections of the paper involve 
one particularly limiting feature. They involve the assumption that labour productivity 
can be increased only if labour has more physical capital with which to work. But recent 
advances in growth theory have stressed the fact that individuals can and do invest in 
education and training, so that their productivity is higher – even if they work with no 
additional amount of physical capital. If labour is expected to be the relatively scarce 
input as the population ages, we can expect that the return to investment in human capital 
will rise. Thus, by excluding this option for increasing labour productivity, the 
simulations that have been reported in the previous section have overestimated the threat 
to our living standards that is posed by aging. The purpose of this section is to explain 
how economists have tried to estimate the magnitude of this overestimate. 
 
Unfortunately, the studies that focus on aging and human capital investment involve 
model economies that are more complicated than those reported in earlier sections. No 
study has applied the simplest version of the human-capital, endogenous productivity 
growth rate model (that is available in the textbooks) to the aging population question. 
Thus, in the appendix to this paper, I report how this can be done. Only the essence of the 
approach, and the results, are explained here in the main body of the paper. 
 
The analysis is an extension of the many overlapping generations framework. Households 
continue to save for their retirement; the main difference is that they have two options for 
investing their savings - in physical capital and human capital. There are two sectors in 
the economy – the goods-producing sector which produces both consumption goods and 
physical capital as before, and the education sector which produces knowledge (human 
capital – which raises each individual's productivity). The education sector uses human 
capital more intensively in the production of knowledge than does the manufacturing 
sector in the production of goods. In the simplest version of the analysis, physical capital  
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is not needed at all in the training sector, so it is employed only in the manufacturing 
sector. It is the fact that knowledge is a man-made input in the production process in this 
extended analysis that makes the nation's productivity growth rate dependent upon both 
demographic events and government policy.  
 
The details concerning the structure and empirical calibration of this model economy are 
given in the appendix. Since we continue to assume that government debt reduction will 
make room in government budgets for rising health-care expenditure, we limit the 
reported experiments to the following three: 
 
(i) An increase in the old-age dependency ratio  Since individuals plan to spend longer in 
retirement, this development induces each individual to save more and to re-evaluate how 
much of her time she spends in training. These responses at the individual level have a 
positive effect on the growth of living standards. However, there is a reduction in 
aggregate human capital, since more individuals are retired, and this has a negative effect. 
The simulations show that these competing influences almost exactly cancel off. The net 
effect on the growth rate of per capita consumption is positive, but it is too small to be 
relevant.  
 
(ii) An increase in life expectancy  This development induces competing effects as well, 
but the specifics are different. The incentive for increased saving is more pronounced, so 
there is, on balance, a noticeable increase in the annual productivity growth rate – 
roughly an additional one tenth of one percentage point in the annual growth rate for an 
increase in life expectancy of 4 years.  
 
(iii) A decrease in the population growth rate  Just as favourable income-level effects 
accompany this dimension of aging in the models that abstract from human capital,  
favourable productivity growth rate effects accompany this same development when 
human capital investment is highlighted. A drop in annual population growth of one 
percentage point yields an increase in the annual productivity growth rate of about one-
third of one percentage point.  
 
Do these results call for a modification of the conclusions reached in the previous 
sections of the paper? In one sense, no modification is required. There is additional 
support for the proposition that the falling population growth rate dimension of an aging 
population is "good news" for average living standards. Nevertheless, there is still the 
concern that there will likely be a rising demand for income redistribution by 
governments in a global setting that may make it difficult for governments to meet this 
demand. Since lower population growth hurts those dependent on government transfers – 
even though it raises the average income level rather dramatically – governments may 
want to override the falling population growth rate dimension of the aging population – 
by allowing increased immigration quotas. Thus, as argued in the previous section of the 
paper, I think it is prudent to identify, but not to count on, this good-news dimension of 
an aging population.  
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Nevertheless, there is one reason why a modified conclusion is called for. In this analysis 
of human capital, we have found that rising life expectancy can be expected to have a  
positive effect on the productivity growth rate that is small, but big enough to compensate 
for the unfavourable one-time level effect of aging that was found in the previous 
sections of the paper. Overall, then, a rather benign view about aging is supported. If it is 
assumed that policy-makers will adjust immigration rates to keep population growth 
roughly constant, there are likely to be neither large negative nor large positive effects on 
either productivity growth or the growth in average living standards. If it is assumed that 
population growth will fall, we will enjoy an increase in the growth rate of living 
standards. 
 
Before concluding this section of the paper, it is worth considering how we might 
develop some confidence concerning the finding that a focus on human capital 
investment does not affect the results dramatically. This is particularly worthwhile since 
there is disagreement on this finding in the literature. On the one hand, Devereux and 
Love's (1994) simulation results concerning tax changes are consistent with the small 
effects reported here for changes in the dependency ratio. However, Fougere and 
Merette's (2000)) simulations involve large effects accompanying both demographic and 
tax changes. A full evaluation of these alternative specifications of training and education 
is beyond this paper. Thus, I provide perspective in another way – by considering the 
following "back of the envelope" calculations (which are explained in more detail in 
Scarth (2000, p. 259)).  
 
Consider shifting resources away from current consumption and into education. Assume 
that the rate of return on education is 10 percent. A shift of 1 percent of GDP would 
lower annual consumption by this much? What would be the pay-off? This reallocation is 
equivalent to society buying an equity every year that pays a dividend of 10 percent. If 
the initial year's GDP value is unity, the present value of the first "equity purchase" is 
)) /( 1 )( 10 )(. 01 (. n r − , where r and n denote the discount rate and the GDP growth rate, 
respectively. Since this permanent shift of resources involves the equivalent of buying 
such an equity every year, the total benefit is  ) ) /( 1 )( 10 )(. 01 (.
2 n r − . The present value of 
the cost is  )) /( 1 )( 01 (. n r − , so the net one-time percentage increase in living standards is 
], 1 )) /( 10 )[(. 01 (. − − n r  which equals 0.04 if r = .04 and n = .02.  
 
Public expenditure on education is about 5 percent of GDP in Canada, so an increase of 
one percentage point is a significant initiative. Roughly speaking, the reasoning in the last 
paragraph suggests that the net benefit is equivalent to a one-time increase in 
consumption of 4 percent. What increase in the annual growth rate brings the same one-
time equivalent benefit? If the interest rate is 4 percent, the answer is an increase in n 
from 0,02 to 0.02078. We can conclude that a significant investment in education can be 
expected to generate an increase in the economy's growth rate of about one-thirteenth of 
one percentage point. It would seem that skepticism is warranted whenever formal 
growth models show more than a modest growth-rate effect following from variations in 
the size of the education sector.    
 
  





In this paper, I have summarized several approaches used by economists to analyze how 
an aging population might affect the growth rate of per-capita consumption. I have 
focused on basic versions of each approach so that non-specialists can better appreciate 
why there are competing effects. A second reason for highlighting the simulation results 
from several simple model economies is so that our comparison of the numerical results 
can be interpreted as bold tests of how robust some conclusions are. Viewed in this way, 
it is noteworthy that a fairly general conclusion has emerged. It appears that the aging 
population will probably lead to only rather modest changes in the growth rate of our 
living standards, and that the net effect could even be a favourable one.   





To highlight the role of training in the growth process, I follow Uzawa (1965) and Lucas 
(1988), and focus on a simple model economy with two sectors. I start with the simplified 
treatment in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Turnovsky ( 1995) and extend it to 
overlapping generations by using Nielsen’s (1994) extension of Blanchard's (1985) 
analysis of household savings behaviour. As long as household utility depends on private 
consumption and government-provided goods in a separable fashion, this specification 
involves private consumption being proportional to broadly defined wealth (the sum of 
physical and human capital). The factor of proportionality is the sum of each individual's 
rate of impatience, m, and the (constant) probability of death, p. More than one newborn 
appears to replace each individual as she dies, so the overall population grows (at rate z).  
 
One sector uses physical capital and labour to produce goods, and these goods can be 
either consumed by households or used by firms as additional capital in future periods of 
time. The second sector involves just labour; it is the education sector which produces 
human capital. Individuals are more productive in the goods sector when they have more 
human capital. The production processes are a Cobb-Douglas function in the goods sector 
(with capital’s share equal to a), and a linear function in the training sector. Net of 
depreciation, the increase in human capital equals B times the amount of human capital, 
H, that is employed in that sector. Parameters b, p, and f are the fraction of non-retired 
individuals that are employed in the manufacturing sector, the annual death probability 
faced by each individual, and the retirement age. As a result, the fraction of the 
population that is working in the training sector is  ) 1 )( 1 (
pf e b
− − − .  
 
Long-run equilibrium exists when the growth rate for all per-capita variables is the same; 
that is when per-capita consumption, per-capita output, per-capita physical capital and 
per-capita human capital all grow at one rate, n, which I use to denote the growth rate in 
living standards. The model is used to determine how a reduction in the retirement age, f, 
an increase in life expectancy (a fall in p), and a reduction in the population growth rate, 
z, affect the growth rate in living standards, n. 
 
Parameter B indicates the gross yield on human capital, since it indicates how much 
"output" follows from employing one unit of "input" in the training sector. It is assumed 
that both physical and human capital wear out with the passage of time at the same 
depreciation rate, d. Thus, the net return on human capital is r* = B – d. Equilibrium 
requires that the pre-tax return on physical capital, r, generate the same net return: r* = 
r(1 - t), where t is the tax rate. With firms in the manufacturing sector hiring physical 
capital so that its marginal product is just equal to its rental cost, we have (Y/K) = (r + 
d)/a, where Y and K denote manufacturing output and physical capital.  
 
The full-equilibrium version of the human capital accumulation identity is: 
 
  ). 1 )( 1 (
pf e b B d z n
− − − = + +      ( 1 )    
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The physical capital accumulation identity, when combined with the resource constraint 
(that output equals the sum of private consumption, C, government programs and 
investment in physical capital), the government budget constraint (that government 
spending equals tY), and the (Y/K) expression given above, implies: 
 
  a r a a t d n x z / * / ) 1 )( 1 ( = − − − + +       ( 2 )  
 
where  . / K C x =  Finally, as derived in Nielsen (1994), the full-equilibrium version of the 
consumption function is  
 




  )]. 1 ( * /[ )] 1 )( 1 )( 1 )( ( [
* − − − − + =
− pf f r e r e t a m p p q   (4) 
 
The total differential of these four equations, along with the definitions of r, r* and the 
expression for (Y/K) given in the last paragraph are used to determine the changes in n, x, 
r, r*, b, q and Y/K that result when changes in life expectancy (1/p), the population 
growth rate (z), and the retirement age (f) are specified.  
 
The model ensures that the discussion of these issues is internally consistent. While it is 
deliberately simplified, the model can be used to illustrate the quantitative effects of these 
developments. To do so, representative parameter values that are suitable if each period is 
interpreted as one year have been selected. The initial values for private consumption, 
government spending and investment in physical capital (as proportions of measured 
(manufactured goods) output) are assumed to be 0.55, 0.27, and 0.18. Physical capital's 
share of output in the manufactured goods sector is 0.33; capital's depreciation rate is 
0.04; the net-of-tax yield on capital is 6 percent; and the initial growth rates of the 
population and per-capita living standards is 0.02 (n = z = 0.02). All other parameter 
values are determined by the equations of the model. The numerical results are reported 
in the paper.  
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